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Milanovic  analyzes  the impact  of direct taxes  This system  is being  replaced  by a ma-rket
and cash social  transfers  on income  distribution  3ystem  in which the labor market is key and
in Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland,  those who cannot  eam enough  must be supported
and Yugoslavia  in the years before  the collapse  by the state. To counteract  increasing  income
of communism.  He contrasts  the results for  disparities,  social transf.  rs must be focused  more
socialist and market  economies.  on the poor. Eastem ELropean  states are ill-
prepared  for this role. lhey have  no experence
Cash social  transfers accounted  for about  a  in identifying  the needy and targeting  support  to
fifth of gross income,  a proportion  comparable  them.  The question  is, toward which world of
with that in developed  welfare  economies.  welfare  capitalism  are the formerly  socialist
Generally,  cash transfers  were unrelated  to  countries  likely to evolve?
income  in social-st  countries,  in marked  contrast
with market  economies,  where  such transfers  go  Milanovic  contends  Chat  the Central  Euro-
mainly to low-income  households.  pean  countries  will probable  evolve toward  the
corporatist  model  of continental  Europe.  Capital-
Direct  taxes played  almost no role  in income  ist countries  in Europe  tend to have  large social
redistribution.  They were small  -1  to 2 percent  transfers  that are often related  to previous
of gross income,  except in Hungary  - and  eamings,  so they have  relatively  limited roles in
proportional  to income.  Most  taxes were paid  by  income  redistribution.  Transfers  are closer  to
enterprises,  as payroll  taxes, and most workers  social  insurance  than to social assistance.
were unaware  of the taxation  and that public
spending  could  not permanently  exceed public  The evoliation  of more a'.;urai  Balkan
revenues  from taxation.  countries  and the Slavic republics  of the former
Soviet  Union  is more difficult  to predict Poorer
In socialist  counties, social support  was  and more agriculture-based  countries  are gener-
built into the system thrugh  full employment  ally less able to administer  welfare schemes,
guarantees,  state-run  pension schemes,  and free  gauge individual  incomes,  and deliver  social
public education  and health care.  The only  support-  and their finances  may be even  more
explicit  policy toward  poverty  involved  alcohol-  strained  than  those of their Central  European
ics, handicapped  people, and other special  counteiparts.
categories.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseninate  the  fimdings  of work  under  way  in  the Bank An  objective  of the  seies
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less dhan  fully  polished. The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers do not necessarily  represer.;  official  Bank  policy.
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Introduction
This paper analyzes  the impact  of cash social transfers  and direct
taxes  on the size income  distribution  in Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland,
Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria  at the  end of the Communist  period. It contrasts
the  results  for socialist  economies  with those  for  market  economies.
The essential  characteristics  of income  distribution  in socialism  are
relatively  well-known.  Despite a different perception, shared by most
economists,  the  data for  East  European  countries,  comparable  in  quality  to
those in market  economies,  have been available  to researchers  regularly
for at least twenty  to twenty-five  years, and have been used in a fair
numbei  of publications. In Yugoslavia,  household  surveys  were available
since  1963  at five-year  intervals  and  after 1984  annually.  Detailed  annual
household  surveys  were conducted  in Poland  since 1978  and published  since
1  The  perception that socialist countries tried  to  "hide" Income
distribution  data Is due  to three factors. The first is refusals to
publish  the data or in'tentional  attempts  at obfuscation  by the  Communist
authorities.  This however  was limited  to a few countries.  Most notorious
were  the Soviet Union  and  Romania. The  second factor is errors of
interpretation  or ignorance  of the existing  sources  displayed  by Western
researchers.  Examples include Lydall's (1984,  p.  195) complaint In an
otherwise  very thorough  discussion  of income  inequality  in  Yugoslavia  that
"(w)hat  is needed  for a study  of...  income  inequality  is a distribution  of
households  or persons ranked by per capita income".  He was apparently
unaware  that  these  data are  published  and are  readily  available.  Morrisson
(1984)  in his often quoted comparative  study of income  distribution  in
capitalist  and so:ialist countries  is even unaware of the existence  of
income  surveys  in Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria;  instead  he uses some dubious
extrapolations.  The third  factor  was that  East  European  students  of income
distribution were  few  as  their  topic  itself  was  regarded by  the
authorities as  rather  suspect.  Despite  that  .iie  area  of  income
distribution  did  not  go  unresearched:  Polish  (Lulek and  Paga,  1989,
Okrasa, 1988,  Gorecki,  Topinska  and Wisniewski,  1984,  Flakierski,  1986),
Hungarian (Adam  and Nosal, 1982),  Yugoslav (Flakierski,  1989,  Milanovic,
1990) or  comparative  East European (Kende and Strmiska, 1988) income
distributions  were well studied  and  papers  were  available  in  English.2
1980.  In Czechoslovakia,  large  household  surveys  were conducted  since 1958
at three- to five-year intervals  although the results were not widely
distributed.  In Hungary,  household  budget  surveys  were conducted  at one-
or two-year intervals  since 1978 and larger income  surveys every five
years since 1962.  Even longer  data series  exist  for the distributions  of
state-sector wages.  In  Poland  and  Hungary,  the  distributions were
published practically  annually since 1956, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
since 1962-3,  and in Czechoslovakia  they were available  at more or less
bi-annual  intervals  since  1959.
The  pattern  of  income  distriLution in  socialism was  recently
summarized  by Phelps-Brown  (1988,  pp. 303-4).
"...the  three  Soviet-type distributions  [Hungarian,  Soviet  and
Czechuslovak]...  are much more egalitarian  than the  Western type.  The
difference arises mainly from a  slower rise of  income above  the
median, that is, broadly: the more skilled manual occupations  and
still  more the higher  clerical,  the professional  and administrative,
are paid less than in the West relatively to the bulk of manual
workers.  Allowance  for 'perks'  reduices  the contrast,  but is unlikely
to remove  it."
While the overall shape of income distribution  is reasonably  well
understood,  very little  is known about some specific  income  distribution
issues, and,  in particular, the  incidence of  taxes and  cash social
transfers.  The incidence  analysis  is not solely  of historic  1 relevance.
While a number of economic  aspects  have changed  in the East, little  has
changed in social policy. This is understandable  because such changes
affect  entitlements  of various  groups,  and, particularly  in conditions  of
decreasing income, such changes are difficult to  implement.  The  only
change of  note  since  the end  of  Communism was  the  introduction of
unemployment  insurance.  The current  distribution  of benefits and taxes
will determine the direction  of future  changes;  only if one knows with
some precision  who are the present  net beneficiaries  can an adequate  new
policy  be designed.
In Section 1,  I discuss distribution of  cash social transfers.
Section 2  looks at the effect of direct and payroll taxes on  income
distribution  and the  combined  impact  of cash transfers  and taxes.  Section
3  contrasts the worlds of welfare socialism and capitalism.  The  last
section presents the  conclusions and  examines the  likely  impact of
transition  to capitalism  on the  current  system  of social  welfare.
The  study is  based  on household  data collected  by statistical  offices3
of the five countries  in 1988 for Czechoslovakia  and 1989 for the rest.
Comparison  among  the  East  European  countries  is  facilitated  by
similarities in  the  survey  design  (see  Annex).  All  surveys  rank
individuals  by their household per  capita  gross income or per  capita
disposable  income  for  Hungary. 2 I  der.ote  such  distribution  as D(ply  ); the
distribution  of persons  (p)  by  per  capJta  household  income  ty  p). In  Polish
and Hungarian  surveys,  households  are div)ded  into ten decile  groups; in
Yugoslav and  Bulgarian surveys into  ten  Income groups, and  in  the
3
Czechoslovak  survey Into twenty-five Income groups.  All  calculations
reported  below are based on grouped data. (The definition  of income is
broadly  similar.  For the details  as well for some  problems  with the data
and their  reliability,  the  reader  should  ccJlsult  Annex.)
In Polish surveys households  are divided into four social groups,
workers,  farmers,  mixed and pensioners  households.  In Yugoslav surveys,
households are  divided  into  three  social  groups, non-agricultural,
including  workers and urban pensioners,  farmers, and mixed households.
Czechoslovak  and Hungarian surveys divide the population into workers,
farmers, and pensioners.  Bulgarian data to which I had access do not
provide Information  about social groups. Throughout the paper, income
includes  money incomes  plus  consumption  in  kind  valued,  by the  Statistical
Offices,  at market  prices.
2  Each individual  in the household is assigned  that household's  per
capita  income.
Income groups contain variable proportions  of recipients (falling
between the  lower and  upper  income bound). We  use  the  term decile
(quintile  etc)  group  only for income  groups  specifically  constructed  as to
include  each 10 (2OW  percent  of recipients.4
Section  1.  The  Role of Cash  Social  Tr~ansfers
Cash soclal transfers included in surveys comprise the following
benefits: pensions, all pension schemes are state-run; various family
allowances,  inclusive  of maternity  allowances;  sickness  benefits;and  other
social  transfers,  such  as stipends. 4 The  magnitude  of social  transfers,  in
percent of household  gross income.  and their concentration  coefficients
are shown  In  Table  I (all  concentration  and  Gini  coefficients  in the  paper
are represented  as percentages,  I  e. multiplied  by 100). 
4 In some  countries  (Poland  and  Bulgaria)  sickness  benef'.ts  are  paid by
enterprises  and thus  are  not shown  as governmenit  (social)  transfers.
5  lThe  concentration  coefficient  C  is a synthetic  indicator  showing  the
concentration  of an income  source  x when recipients  are ranked  by amounts
of y (say,  disposable  income).  Graphically,  when cumulative  percentage  of
recipients (ranked according to  y)  are  shown on  the  abscissa, and
cumulative  percentages  of x  are shown on the ordinate, the line that
connects the two is called the concentration  curve. The  concentration
coefficient  is equal  to twice  the  area that  lies  between  the concentration
curve  and the  45° line (line  of equality).  The concentration  curve  can  lie
below (above)  the line of equality. In the special case when x-y, the
concentratior.  coefficient is equal to  the Gini  coefficient, and  the
concentration curve  is  called  the  Lorenz  curve.  The  concentration
coefficient  ranges  from -1 when all (say)  transfers  are received  by the
poorest  individual  thrc th  0 when all individuals  receive  the  same amount
of transfer  income,  to +1 wh.n all transfers  are received  by the richest
individual.  When the  concentrati  ;oefficient  is  0, it coincides  with the
450 line.  When it lies  above  the line  of equality  it is  negative;  when it
lies  below  the  line  of equality,  it is  positive.Table  1.  STRUCTURE  AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF SOCIAL  TRANSFERS
(all  households)
Percent  of gross income  POL  YUGO  CS-fI  HUN  BULG
1989  1989  1988  1989  1989
Pensions  15.2  12.1  16.5  13.4  16.6
Family  allowances  5.5  5.6  6.0  2.3
Sickness  benefits  3.0  2.0
Othe-  social  transfers  1.4  1.2  0.4  1.1  2.3
Total  transfers  22.1  13.3  25.4  22.4  21.2
Concentration  coefficients
Per.naons  -2.6  38.2  8.1  9.5  10.9
Family  allowances  -12.3  -28.4  -21.9  -17.2
Sickness  benefits  13.3  22.1
Other  social  transfers  14.2  25.8  -19.3  -7.2  5.3
Total  transfers  -3.9  37.1  0.3  l.4  7.2
(t-values)a/  (-2.4)  (7.4)  (0.2)  (1.5)  (1.8)
Gross Income  b/  26.1  37.9  19.5  23.1  21.7
a/ Standard  errors of concentration  coefficients  for all transfers
are  calculated using  the  Jackknife technique suggested by  Sandstrom,
Wretman  and  Walden  (1988,  p.116).
b/ For Poland, CSFR, Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria,  gross income (after
payroll taxes)  but before a practically  negligible  personal income  tax.
For  Hungary,  disposable  income.
Note:  *  =  significant  at 5 p,'-cent.
=  significant  at 1  percent.6
The  size  and  distribution  of  social  transt  rs  are  remarkably  similar
in  the  three  Central  European  countries  and  Bul 6aria.  Social  transfers  in
cash account  for  between  21 and  25  percent  of  nousehold  gross  income  in
the  Central  European  countries  and  Bulgaria  but  for  only 13  percent  in
Yugoslavia.6  The  share  of  pensions  in  household  gross  income  is  contained
within  an even  narrower  range:  between  12  percent  ..  Yugoslavia  and 16.5
percent  in Hungary  and Bulgaria.  Pensions  account  for approximately
two-thirds  of  all  cash  social  transfers.
In Poland, CSFR, Hungary and Bulgaria,  social trai.sfers  are
distributed almost  equally  across  income  groups.  Concentration
coefficients  are  very  small  and,  with the  exception  of Poland,  are  not
statistically  significantl;  different  from zero.  A  zero concentration
coefficient  indicates  that  transfers  are  Independent  of  total  income.  This
practically  flat  per  capita  distributlon  of social  transfers  is  in  sharp
contrast  to the situation  in market  economies  where  cash  transfers  are
focused  on  the poorer segments  of  the population  (Figure  1).7 The
concentration  coefficients  of cash  transfers  in  market  economies  in our
sample,  see Table  2, range  from  -16 to -44.  The negative  sign  of the
coefficient  indicates  that  transfers  are  skewed  towards  the  poor;  they  are
progressive. 8
6  Gross  income is  equal  to  original income  (wages plus  net
self-employment  income  plus property  income  plus other income  beforo
government  redistribution)  plus  government  cash  transfers.  Gross  income  is
the  central  income  concept  that  I  use.  Wages  are  net  of  payroll  taxes  (see
Section  2). Disposable  income  is equal to gross incomev  minus  direct
personal  taxes.  Since direct  personal  taxes in all countries  except
Hungary  are  negligible,  there  is  no  practical  difference  between  gross  and
disposable  income.
7  The  increase  in  transfers  between  the  first  and  the  second  decile  in
the  UK and Sweden  occurs  because  individuals  in the second  and third
income  decile  recei-e  most of the transfers  in the  form  of relatively
higher pensions  while those in the lowest  decile receive  them as
relatively  lower  non-contributory  benefits  (welfare).
8  Progressivity  compares the  distribution  of  an  income source
(transfer)  or  a tax  with  the  distribution  of  gross  income.  For  taxes,  when
their  share  in  gross  income  increases  with  increase  in  income,  we  say  that7
Figure  1
Cash transfers by Income  deciles
(country average  1)
2
1. 
1  2  3  4  O  O  r  e  0l
Irnoms  dealls  (poorst  to rlohst)
Sources:  Sweden:  calculated  from Bishop,  Formby  and Thistle (1990,  Table
3). United Kingdom: calculated  from United Kingdom Central Statistical
Office (1992,  Table  4 Appendix  1, p.142).  Poland  and Hungary:  Calculated
from household  surveys.
Year and ranking criteria:  Sweden, 1981, ranking according to original
income. UK, 1989, households  ranked according to equivalent  disposable
income. Hungary, 1989, individuals  ranked according to household per
capita  disposable  income.  Poland,  1989 and  CSFR, 1988,  individuals  ranked
according  to  household  per capita  gross  income.
taxes are progressive.  Conversely, for  transfers, when  the  share of
transfers  in gross income  decreases  with level of income, we say that
transfers are progressive.  Also, it should be noted that in general
progressivity  calculated  when recipients  are ranked  by their  per  capita
income  will tend to be greater  than if recipients  are ranked  by household
total  income  (see  Rule number  3 in  Milanovic,  1992).S
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Note:  The  concentratiox,  coefficient ranges from  -ICO  when  all
transfers are received by  the poorest individual  through 0  when  all
Individuals  receive the same amount, to +100 when all  transfers are
received  by the  richest  individual.  Consequently,  morn negative  values  of
the  concentration  coefficient  indicate  greater  emphasis  on the  poor.
For  all  economies the  ranking of  individuals  or  households is
according  to gross income;  only for Hungary  and the  UK (1989)  the ranking
is  according  to disposable  (disposable  equivalent  for the  UK) income.  Data
for  OECD countries,  except  UK 1989,  are  calculated  from  O'Higgins,  Schmaus
and Stephenson  (1989,  Table 4) and refer  to the period 1979-82.  UK 1989
calculated  from United  Kingdom  Central  Statistical  Office (1992,  Table 4
Appendix 1, p.142). Data for socialist  economies  are from the surveys.
Data  for  Chile  include  state-mandated  pensions;  they  are  for the  year 1987
and are  calculated from Haindl, Budinich and  Irrazaval (1989, Table
1.10-1.12,  pp. 47-9).  Since the  data for  market  economies  are of the form
D(HjyH)  while the  data for socialist  economies  and Chile are of the form
D(plyp  )  transfers would  appear  somewhat less progressive in  market
economies  (see  Rule number  3 in Milanovic,  1992).  The opposite  effect  is
exerted by  the  fact  that  gross  income in  socialist economies is
practically  the same as disposable  income (a-  calculated  progressivity
decreases  as we move from original  to  gross  to  uisposable  income).
I9
For comparability  purposes,  I  have  used in Table  2 only such  data for
market  economies  where recipients  are ranked  according  to gross Income.
The more  frequently  available  data, where  recipients  are ranked  according
to original  income,  show greater  progressivity  of transfers.5  This occurs
because  of the  violation  of horizontal  equity  as some households  with low
original income and  high transfers overtake households with a  higher
original Income and  lower transfers.  Relatively better-off  households,
according  to gross or disposable  income,  are then shown as recipients  of
transfers  and the degree of the calculated  progressivity  decreases. In
general,  we expect  progressivity  to go down as we move from original  to
gross  to  disposable  income.
Among  East  European  countries,  Yugoslavia  is an exception  because  the
distribution  of social transfers  approximates  the distribution  of Zr,ss
income  (see  Table 1).  This is  due to the republicanization  ef pension  and
social  welfare funds whereby significant  differences  in average pension
levels, reflecting differences in  wages,  between richer and  poorer
republics  were  maintained.
Family allowances  play a very important  role in the three Central
European countries.  They are, after pensions, the most important  cash
transfer,  with a share in gross income  of 5 to 6 percent.  This contrasts
with an average share  of 1-1.5  percent  of gross income  in West European
market  economies.  ° In Poland,  family  allowances  are not paid to private
farmers  and the difference  between  private  farmers  and workers,  in terms
how much  family  allowances  they  receive,  Is substantial  (Table  3).
9  See,  for example,  Mitchell  (1991,  Annex  C).
10  Calculated  from O'Higgins,  Schmaus  and  Stephenson  (1989,  p. 116).10
Table  3. SIZE  OF FAMILY  ALLOWANCES
(in  percentage  of gross income)
POL  CSFR  HUN  BULG
Workers  7.2  5.4  6.3  2.5
Farmers  0.5  6.4  7.4  1.2
(1)  Concentration  coeff.
for  gross income  less
'  '.ly  allowances  26.7  21.1  24.4  22.1
(2)  Gini coefficient  for
gross Income  a/  26.1  19.5  23.1  21.7
(2)-(l)  -0.6  -1.6  -1.3  -0.4
___________________________
a/ For Poland,  CSFR and Bulgaria,  gross Income  (after  payroll taxes),  for
Hungary,  disposable  income.
Family  allowances  are strongly  pro-poor  even In absolute  terms.  This
means that poor households  receive more of them not only in relative
terms,  I.e. In comparison  to their income,  but also In absolute  amounts
(Figure  2). Family allowances  are the only income  source that is both
Important  and focused on the poor, albe't  by default,  because they are
paid In respect  of children,  and there is generally  a strong  correlation
between  the  number  of children  and the level  of per capita  income.  Family
allowances  achieve a significant  reduction in inequality,  lowering  the
overall  Gini coefficient  by 0.4 points  In Bulgaria,  0.6 points  in Poland,
1.3  points in Hungary  and 1.6  points in CSFR (Table  3). Pro-poor  family
allowances, combined with  pensions  that  account for  two-thirds to
three-fourth of  total cash  transfers and  display  low  concentration
coefficients,  8  to 9 In CSFR and Hungary, 11 In Bulgaria,  and -2.6 in
Poland,  produce  the  already  noted  almost  equal  per capita  distribution  of
all  cash transfers.11
Figure  2
Family allowances by Income decile
(country  average a 1)
2
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Sources:  Household  surveys.12
Section  2. Diract  Taxz,tion  and'Overall  Redistribution
Direct or quasi-direct  taxation In socialist economies takes two
forms:  payroll  taxes  and  direct  personal  taxes.  Payroll  taxes  amounting  to
40-50 percent  of the net wage-bill are the main source  of quasi-direct
taxation,  and they finance pay-as-you-earn  systems of  social security
although  that  link  in  socialist  economies  is  often  weak.  1  For  example,  the
link  was either  legally  non-existent,  as in Czechoslovakia  and Bulgaria,
orsocial  security  shortfalls  were routinely  financed  out of the budget  as
in Poland  and the former  Yugoslavia.  Heavy reliance  on payroll taxation
can be explained  by the  unwillingness  of governments  to depend  for their
revenues  on  profits  that,  in  enterprises  controlled  by workers,  can easily
be "swallowed"  by higher  wage payments.
Payroll taxes are automatically  withheld at  the  source and  are
effectively  paid by enterprises.  This is true even in Hungary where,
following  the tax reform in 1988-89,  social security  contributions  were
divided between employee- and  enterprise-financed  parts. At  the time,
wages  were  almost  automatically raised by  the  amount  of  employee
contribution.  Payroll  taxes  are proportional  to wages,  although  there  are
some departures  from proportionality  In Czechoslovakia  and Hungary,  and
whether  they  have a redistributive  role is  determined  by the relationship
ii  It  was pointed  out by a referee  that  quasi-direct  (payroll)  taxes  in
socialism  had little  effect  on demand  for labor  and hence  on wage rates.
This point must be borne in mind when comparing  who bears the brunt of
taxation  in socialism  and capitalism.  In both cases I assume  that direct
taxes  are  borne  by those  are  nominally  responsible  for their  payment:  this
assumption may  be  more warranted for  capitalist than  for  socialist
countries.13
between  wages  and  overall  lncome.  r1  If  wages  are  a stro,.gly  pro-rich  sour^e
of income,  meaning that the share of wages in ircome is rising as the
level of  income goes  up,  proportional payroll taxes can  have  some
redistributive  role. It  would be akin to proportional  taxation  of capital
gains, or  indirect taxation of  a  good  whose  income elasticity of
consumption  is greater than 1.13 In reality,  the share  of wages In total
income  in socialist economies  exhibits  less variation than in the West
(Figure  3). It follows an almost inverted  U shape, rising for low and
middle  income  groups  and then  decreasing  or stagnating  for the  top  groups.
A proportional  tax  on wages,  though  substantial,  25 to 45 percent  of gross
income, is therefore unlikely to have but a  small impact on overall
inequality.  In  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Poland,  payroll  tax increases  income
concentration  by approximately  I Gini point. In Yugoslavia and  CSFR,
Income  concentration  is  slightly  reduced  (see  Table  5).
12  In  Czechoslovakia,  wage tax  rebates  are  given in respect  to  dependent
child  but at a rate increasing  with the  wage level.  The overall  impact  of
wage taxes  on inequality  was thus a product  of two  opposing  effects:  the
number of  children which  is negatively correlated  with household per
capita income, and the wage level which is positively correlated.  See
Dlouhy  (1991,  p. 4).
Strictly, if the concentration  curve of an  income source s  lies
outside  the  Lorenz  curve,  then  proportional  tax  on s will shift  the  Lorenz
curve inward. This will happen because the importance  of the pro-rich
source  s in total  income  will  decrease.14
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S-ources:  For  Hungary  and  CSFR,  household  surveys.  For  UK,  United  Kingdom
Central  Statistical  Office  (1992,  Table  4  Appendix  1,  p.142).15
Direct taxation of  personal incomes existed only  in  Hungary. A
personal  income  tax  levied  only  on  very  high  incomes existed  in
Yugoslavia,  Bulgaria,  and Poland,  the so-called  equalization  tax,  but its
importance  was  negligible,  barely  exceeding  1  percent  of households'  gross
income (Table  4). The redistributive  role of direct taxes was therefore
minimal except in Hungary  where the fiscal system  was reformed in line
with those  existing  in  market  economies.
In comparison  with direct taxes, the redistributive  role of cash
social  transfers  is  much more important.  The  addition  of cash transfers  to
original  income  reduces  the concentration  coefficient  by between  6.5 and
8.5 Gini points in CSFR, Hungary and  ?oland, and  about 4  points in
Bulgaria (Table  5). As expected,  payroll  and wage taxes  have practically
no impact  except  in  Hungary  where  direct  taxes  reduce  income  concentration
by 1.7  Gini points.  In Yugoslavia,  social  transfers  and  direct taxes  have
practically  no effect  on original  income  distribution.14
14  These  are  only  approximate effects  of  redistribution because
departures  from horizontal  equity  are not accounted  for. For example,  for
Poland, CSFR and Yugoslavia, the Gini  coefficient  is calculated with
respect  to gross income  (Gg).  The concentration  coefficient  of disposable
income (Cd) is less than or equal to the Gini coefficient  of disposable
income (Gd). Consequently,  redistribution  measured  by Cd-Gg will be an
overestimate  of G  d-Gg. The redistributive  Impact of social transfers,
however,  is  underestimated  because  it is  measured  by C0-Gg  rather  than,  as
It ideally  should  be, by G0-Gg  where  o=original  income.16
Table  4.  IMPORTANCE  OF DIRECT AND  PAYROLL  TAXES
(all  households)
As percent  of gross incomea/  POL  YUGO  CSFR  HUN  BULG
Payroll  taxes  24.6  32.0  45.7  29.4  23.7
Direct  taxes  1.0  1.2  8.5
Other  taxesb/  2.2
All  taxes  25.6  33.2  45.7  40.1  23.7
Concentration  coefficients  c/
Payroll  taxes  30.5  40.4  28.3  27.3  20.7
Direct  taxes  n.a.  42.1  41.3
Other  taxes  18.4
All taxes  30.5  40.5  28.3  29.8  20.7
Gross  income  d/  26.1  37.9  19.5  23.1  21.7
a/ Gross income  does not include  payroll taxes.  Payroll taxes are
given as  percentage of  gross  income simply in order  to  show their
importance.
b/ Includes  fees,  duties  and  various  mandated  contributions.
c/ For the  definition  of the  concentration  coefficient  see  Table  2.
d/ For Poland,  CSFR and  Bulgaria,  gross  income  (after  payroll  taxes),
but before a practically  negligible  personal income tax. For Hungary,
disposable  income.
Sources: In Hungary there are the employee- (10 percent of gross
wage)  and  the  enterprise-financed  (43 percent of  wage  bill)  social
security contributions. The  data  on  the  employee-financed  part  are
reported  in household  surveys;  I impute  the enterprise-financed  part. In
Czechoslovakia  there are also two taxes on state-sector  labor.  Wage tax
(12.4  percent  of  gross  wage)  is  reported  in  household  surveys;  payroll  tax
paid  by enterprises  is 50 percent  and is  imputed.  In  Poland  (43  percent  of
the  wage bill),  Yugoslavia  (51.4  percent),  and  Bulgaria  (42  percent),  the
whole tax is paid by enterprises  and is imputed.  Yugoslav  taxes finance
also health  and  education.  Bulgarian  tax is composed  of 30 percent  social
security  tax  and an estimated  12  percent wage  tax  withheld  at  source.17
Table  5. REDISTRIBUTION  THROUGH  SOCIAL  TRANSFERS  AND  DIRECT  TAXES
(all  households)
SOCIALIST  ECONOMIES
Concentration  coeff.  POL  YUGO  CSFR  HUN  BULG  Average
Original  income
before  payroll  tax  33.5  38.7  26.9  31.0  24.5  30.9
Original  income  34.5  38.1  26.0  31.9  25.6  31.2
Gross income  26.0  37.9  19.5  24.8  21.7  26.0
DisposaAle  income  n.a.  37.9  n.a.  23.1  n.a.
Changes  (in  Gini  points)  due to:
Payroll  tax  +1.0  -0.6  -0.9  +0.  +1.1.  +0.3
Cash  transfers  -8.5  -0.2  -6.5  -7.1  -3.9  -5.2
Direct  taxes  n.a.  0.0  n.a.  -1.7  n.a.
Change  in concentration  coefficient
per 1  percent  of gross  income
transferred  or taxed (xlOO)
Cash  transfers  -40.8  -1.0  -25.7  -31.7  -18.4  -23.3
Direct  taxes  -10.3
MARKET  ECONOMIES
Concentration  coeff.  UK  SWED  AUSTR  US  GER  Average
1979  1981  1981-2  1979  1981
Original  income  39.3  41.7  41.4  42.5  40.7  41.1
Gross  income  29.3  24.1  33.6  36.9  28.0  30.4
Disposable  income  26.4  19.7  28.7  31.7  25.2  26.3
Changes  (in  Gini  points)  due to:
Cash  transfers  -10.0  -17.6  -7.8  -5.6  -12.7  -10.7
Direct  taxes  -2.9  -4.4  -4.9  -5.2  -2.8  -4.1
Change  in  concentration  coefficient
per  1  percent  of  gross  income
transferred  or  taxed  (xlOO)
Cash  transfers  -49.0  -45.9  -79.6  -66.7  -63.5  -60.9
Direct  taxes  -17.5  -14.8  -22.6  -24.9  -11.7  -18.3
___________________________
a/ Includes  payroll  taxes  paid  by  the  employees.
Definitions: Original  Income  =  original  Income  before  payroll  tax  +
payroll  tax.
Gross Income  =  original Income  +  cash transfers.
Disposable  Income  =  gross Income  - direct  taxes.
Sources:  Data  for  market  economies  are  derived  from  Kitchell  (1991,
Tables  C.1  and  C.3  In  AppendIx  C,  pp.  221-2).  For  socialist  economies, see
sources  In Table  4.18
In market  economies,  too, transfers  are much more potent instrument
of redistribution  than taxes;  but there are two Important  differences:
taxes do play some redistributive  role, and social transfers  are more
efficient,  In the sense  that the same amount  of cash transfers,  measured
as percentage  of gross household  Income,  achieve a greater reduction  in
the concentration  of income.  As Table 5 shows, in market economies the
concentration  coefficient  of gross Income is about 11 Gini points less
than the concentration  coefficient  of original  income.  This reduction  In
inequality  Is achieved  through  transfers  that  are less  than 10 percent  of
gross household  income  In the  United  States  and Australia,  13 percent in
the  United  Kingdom in 1989,  20 percent  in West Germany  and in the  United
Kingdom in 1979, and 38 percent in Sweden. In socialist  economies,  the
difference  between  concentration  coefficients  of original  and gross  income
is,  on average,  5.2 Gini points,  while cash transfers  are between  21 and
25 percent  of gross Income  (except  in Yugoslavia:  13.3  percent).  Thus, on
average,  cash transfers  that  amount  to one percent  of gross income  lower
the concentration  of income  by 0.633  Gini points in market  economies  and
by  0.233 Gini points, or  0.3  points  If Yugoslavia Is excluded, in
socialist economies. East European countries uniformly score less on
efficiency,  Implying  that  the  differences  are systematic.
If we  compare the  UK  data  for  1979 and  1989, an  interesting
conclusion  regarding  the  effects  of Thatcherism  on income  distribution  and
transfers  emerges.  Cash transfer's  focus on the poor has improved,  the
efficiency  per unit of transfered  income  has increased  by half,  while the
size of transfers  has decreased.  Direct  taxation,  on the other  hand, has
become  less  progressive:  one  percent  of taxed  gross income  reduced income
concentration  by 0.175  Gini points in 1979  and by only 0.069 Gini points
ten years later.  These results  may be typical  for a number  of countries
that in the 1980s  proceeded  both to streamline  their  welfare systems  and
to reduce  marginal  tax rates.  To the  extent  that  better  targeting  offsets
the effect of smaller size of transfers (see the data for the United
Kingdom  in Table 5 where  cash transfers  reduce  the  Gini coefficient  by 10
points  In  both 1979  and 1989),  we can conclude  that the  observed  Increased
inequality is due  to higher inequality in original incomes and  much
smaller  redistributive  role of taxes.  The corrollary  is, of course,  that
transfers  can  be  reduced  without  detrimental  effect  on  income
distribution.19
The  net  balance between cash  social transfers and  direct  and
quasi-direct  taxes  in CSFR,  Hungary  and the United  Kangdom,  used here as
an example  for  market  economies,  is  shown  in  Figure  4.  i  In  socialism,  cash
transfers  are practically  uniform  across the population  while direct  and
quasi-direct  taxes are proportional  to income.  Poor households  therefore
receive benefits equal to their share In the population  and pay  taxes
equal to their share In gross Income  or wages. The result Is a gently
sloped  downward  curve  of net benefits  that starts  with positive  benefits
of 15-20 percent of gross income  for the two lowest income  deciles and
becomes  slightly  negative  already  for the third  decile.  The share  of net
benefits  in gross income  of poor households/individuals  is significantly
greater in the United Kingdom. The gradient of  the UK  curve Is much
sharper  as households  in the two lowest  deciles  receive  about  one-half  of
their  gross income  In the form of net benefits  while the  balance is zero
for the  fifth  decile.
Less  progressive  transfers  and taxes  In socialism  are  also  a response
to  the  fact  that there  Is  less to  equalize because the  underlying
distribution  of wages and  of original  Income  is generally  more equal than
in  capitalism.
is  Net  benefits are  defined as  the difference between cash social
transfers  (Table  1)  and direct  and quasi-direct  taxes (Table  4). Indirect
taxes and subsidies,  and benefits  in-kind  are not Included.  To make the
data for East European  countries  and the UK more comparable,  employers'
contributions  to National Insurance  In the  UK are assumed  to be paid by
workers (as It  is implicitly  assumed for all of payroll taxation In
Eastern  Europe).20
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Section  3. The  World  of Welfare  Socialism
The socialist  system  of taxes and transfers  displays  features that
are different  from those found in market economies.  In a  recent book,
Esping-Andersen  (1990)  defines three  worlds, or arche-types,  of welfare
capitalism.  These are the liberal  wor'd of residual  social  welfare  where
transfers  are limited and generally means-tested,  the conservative  and
corporatist  world  of sizable  yet  mostly  earning-related  transfers,  and the
socio-democratic  world  of big social  transfers  where  welfare  Is treated  as
a universal  right.  In terms  of countries,  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  Japan  and
Switzerland belong  to  the  liberal world, continental Europe to  the
conservative world,  and  Scandinavia and  the  Netherlands  to  the
social-democratic  world.
The  socialist  welfar,  system  differs  from the  three  capitalist  worlds
by virtue  of an almost  total  absence  of transfer  targeting.  This is  due to
the  Intrinsic  features of  the system. With full employment and high
participation  rates,  the role of social  transfers  cannot  be to compensate
for lack  of labor income.  The poor are generally  those  outside  the state
employment  and  pension  system:  they  are  accidents  who live  at the  societal
margin. The  Communist state, whose  philosophical  foundation Is  that
everybody  should  work,  preferably  in the  state  sector,  tends  to regard  the
poor as unworthy of sympathy  and aid. This was, in a certain  way, the
Calvinist  work-ethic  pushed  to its extreme.  Moreover,  the system  being a
dictatorship,  there was no need even for the enlightened  self-interest
that  prompted  the  Victorian  upper  classes  to accede  to a residual  welfare
system in order to preempt  a lower-class  uprising.  On the other hand, a
compressed  wage structure  and relatively  mild income  differences  do not
call  for  a progressive  tax  system.
Tn  terms of the size of transfers,  the socialist welfare system
stands  between  the  conservative  and  the  social-democratiu  system.  16
16  Social  transfers  expressed  in terms  of total  households'  income  are
often  greater in socialist  than in market  economies  while the reverse is
true  when transfers  are expressed  in terms  of GDP. Thus for the  period  of
the 1980s,  Rutkowska (1991)  finds that cash social transfers  in Poland,
Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and Yugoslavia  averaged  about 10 percent of GDP
vs. 12 percent for OECD as a whole and  15.8 for social welfare OECD
countries.  In terms of households  income, the difference  is less or is
moreover in favor of socialist  countries.  This is due to the fact that22
It could be asked if the differences  in the size of transfers  and
targeting  are  due to systemic  differences  between  socialist  and  capitalist
economies  or, for example,  to differences  in incomr  levels.17  The reason
why the  differences  are, in  my opinion,  systemic  is that  the  observed  size
and pattern of transfers  in socialism  can be directly related to some
philosophical  premises  on which the system  was based.  The large  size of
transfers  is derived  from the emphasis  on social  consumption  rather  than
on individual  consumption.  Lack of targeting  derives  both  from the  absence
of large  market  income  differences,  which  in r%her  countries  transfers  are
supposed  to even out, lack  of concern  with the poor,  as explained  above,
and  egalitarianism  Implicit  in emphasis  on social  consumption.
Figure  5 broadly  accords  with  Esping-Andersen's  classification  except
for  the  rather  unique  position  of  the  Swedish  system  whose  key
characteristics  are not, it seems,  shared  by Norway. The United  States,
Canada  and Israel  have  very targeted  systems.  This is  probably  due to the
relative  parsimony of their systems. Britain (in the late 1970s) and
Sweden  have the least  targeted  welfare  system  among the  market  economies.
The  British  situation  had changed  In the  1980s  because  the  decrease  in.  the
size  of transfers  was  accompanied  by better  targeting  (see  the  SW  movement
of the UK data point). Similar change can be expected in Sweden whose
welfare  system  is currently  undergoing  major  reforms.
Flat transfers  in socialism  preserve  horizontal  equity. If transfers
are  distributed  equally  per  capita,  income  rankings  of individuals  cannot
be changed.  This is in contrast  to the hypothesis  put forth by Okrasa
(1988,  p. 637), namely that "[r]edistribution  of income through  social
transfers in Poland -and in the East- pays more attention to vertical
equity  across  particular  socio-economic  groups than in the West, but at
the  same time it is less  successful  in  meeting  the  objective  of horizontal
equity".  The  first  part  of his statement  is  correct  but  not the  second.
households receive a  smaller portion of  GDP  in  socialism than  in
capitalism:  for  example,  almost  none  of corporate  saving  and investment  in
socialism  is  mediated  through  personal  (household)  income.
17  I  am thankful  to  a referee  for  pointing  out  this  problem.23
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Section  4. Conclusions
Cash  social  transfers  in socialist  economies  in the  years  immediately
preceding the collapse of  socialism accounted for  about  a  fifth of
population  gross income,  a percentage  comparable  with that in developed
welfare  economies.  Transfers  were generally  unrelated  to income  levels  and
were paid on the  basis  of demographic  characteristics.  To the  extent  that
some  of the  characteristics  were correlated  with income,  certain  transfers
like  family  allowances  played  a redistributive  function.  Overall,  however,
cash transfers  were unrelated  to income.  This  is In marked  contrast  to the
situation  In market economies  where transfers  are focused on low-income
households.
Direct  taxes  played  almost  no role in redistribution.  They were both
very small in the aggregate,  1 to 2 percent of gross income  except In
Hungary,  and  proportional to  Income. Most  taxation  was  paid  by
enterprises,  in the  form  of payroll  taxes,  and there  was little  awareness
among workers that  they ultimately bore  the  taxes and  that social
transfers had a  limit In  the amount of  taxes raised. This attitude
stimulated  Inordinate  demands  for state  spending  unrelated  to the  ability
of the  state  to raise  revenues.
An important  issue during the tranvition  will be the relationship
between income  and wage distribution,  on the one hand, and cash social
transfers  on the other.  Currently,  wages and cash transfers  account  for
about  80 percent  of household  gross Income.  The distribution  of both will
change. Wages, are  likely to become more unequal. To  counteract an
increase  in income  disparities,  social  transfers  must become  more focused
on the  poor.
The  relationship between  increased wage  disparity and  better
provision of social support Is not novel. During the transition  from
feudalism to capitalism,  the  labor market supplanted  personalized  and
paternalistic  relationships  and weakened  a number  of social  buffers  such
as guilds and the family. The transition  to capitalism  resulted In an
increase in the number of the poor because many could not command a
sufficient  wage in the  labor  market.  This,  in turn,  necessitated  that the
state  take  the  role of provider  of last  resort.  The situation  in  countries
in transition from socialism to capitalism is similar. Ln socialism,
social  support was  built  Into  the  system  through full  employment
guarantees,  state-run  pension schemes,  free provision of education and25
health care. An explicit state policy toward  poverty was not necessary
and, indeed,  did not exist.  Anti-poverty  policy  dealt only with cases  of
alcoholics,  the handicapped,  etc. Such a system is iaing replaced  by a
market  system  where labor  market  plays the key role and those  who cannot
earn  a sufficient  wage  must be supported  by the  state.
However  paradoxical  it may seem at first  sight,  the state  in Eastern
Europe  is Ill-prepared  for this task.  Although  the role of the state  was
pervasive in socialism,  the state had no experience  in identifying  the
needy  and  delivering  support.  Yet the  state  will have to take  upon itself
such  a role  as transition  to  a market  system  occurs.  The  question  is then,
toward which world of welfare capitalism  are East European countries
likely  to evolve.
The most probable  evolution  of Central  European  countries  is toward
the corporatist  model  of  continental  Europe. Capitalist countries of
continental  Europe have large social transfers;  because transfers are
often  related  to  previous  earnings  they  have rather  limited  redistributive
role and  follow more  closely the  social  insurance than  the  social
assistance  principle.  Neither  the  size  nor the  main  principles  of transfer
determination  would need to be altered significantly  for  the Central
European  countries  to  begin to  resemble  their  capitalist  neighbors.
The evoiution  of the  welfare  systems  in the  more agricultural  Balkan
countries  and in the  Slavic  republics  of the former  Soviet  Union is more
difficult  to  predict.  Some elements  that  characterize  corporatist  European
systems are  present in  these  countries too. However, an  important
difference between Central Europe  and  the  more  agricultural former
socialist  countries  is lower  ability  of the  more  agricultural  countries  to
administer  welfare schemes,  gauge individual  incomes and deliver social
support.  In  addition,  their  finances  may be even more strained  making  all
universal  welfare  schemes  nearly  impossible  to finance.26
ANNEX  - CHARACTERISTICS  OF SURVEYS  AND  ADEQUACY  OF DATA
Data  s*urces
In our analysis we use household surveys data published by  the
central  statistical  offices  of five countries.  The publications  used are
the  following.  For Poland, the data are published  in Budzety  Gospodarstw
Domowych  w  1989 Roku, Warsaw: Central  Statistical  Office, 1990. In our
analysis we  use  the unpublished  decile data supplied by  the Central
Statistical  Office.  For Yugoslavia,  the  data come from Anketa  o potrosnJl
domacinstava  u 1989:  Raspoloziva  i  upotreblJena  sredstva:  Proseci  po clarnu
domaclnstva,  Statistical  Bulletin  No.1845, Belgrade: Federal Office of
Statistics,  1990.  As explained  below,  Yugoslav  income  data  were corrected.
For Czechoslovakia,  the data are published in Mlkrocensus 1988:1.dil,
Prague: Federal Statistical  Office, 1990. Data for Hungary (1989) and
Bulgaria  (1989)  were supplied  by the  countries'  Central  Statistical  Office
(CSO) on computer spreadsheets  and  are available from  the author on
request.
Yugoslav,  Polish and Bulgarian surveys are conducted  annually. In
1989,  they  covered  respectively 6230,  28285  and  2720  households,
representing  approximately  0.1, 0.25 and 0.09 percent of all households.
Yugoslav  and Polish  surveys  have been frequently  used by researchers  and
are considered  fairly  reliable  even if not  entirely  free  of problems.  For
example, the definition  of income in the Yugoslav survey Is incorrect
because  the  concept  used Is  more akin  to revenues;  the  published  data  were
therefore corrected and  several categories, withdrawals from  saving
accounts,  sale  of assets,  were subtracted.  In  Poland, surveys  cover  about
90 percent of the population,  leaving out the non-agricultural  private
sector, army and  police personnel. The  Bulgarian survey follows the
so-called  boranch  principle,  which means that households  are selected  at
the  place  of work.  This provides  for  a good check  of wage data but biases
the  results  since  some  household  incomes  are  unreported  because  the  survey
relies  only  on recollections  of one  household  member  and some  groups,  such
as private  sector  workers  and  students,  are  underrepresented
The Czechoslovak  survey  is a periodic  survey.  The last survey  prior
to the  one in 1988  was conducted  in 1985.  The 1988 survey  Includes  about
1.9  percent  of all  households.  Hungarian  data originate  from two  separate
sources. The  first  is  the  1987 Income survey done  on  about  22,000
hnimaholds,  0.55 percent  of all households.  Income  surveys  are conducted27
every  five years.  The second  is the 1989 household  budget  survey.  Budget
surveys  are  done  every  two  years  on about 12,000  households.  The  Hungarian
CSO analysts  hold that income  surveys provide better income  data while
budget  surveys  are  deemed  more  reliable  for  expenditures. Using
micro-simulations,  the CSO updated eari.ing/income  figures from the 1987
Income survey to obtain income estimates for 1989. The CSO thus also
accounted  for the impact  of personal  income  taxation  Introduced  in 1988.  A
statistical  reweighting  was  then undertaken to  reconcile the  updated
income  survey  and the  budget  survey  and  produce  a single  set  of data.
Ranking  of  Recipients
Polish  and  Hungarian  data rank individuals  Into  ten  deciles  according
to  respectively gross  and  disposable  income per  household member.
Yugoslav,  Bulgarian  and Czechoslovak  surveys rank households  and, since
the data on average household  size are provided,  also individuals  Into
ten, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,  and  twenty-five,  in the CSFR, income
groups. Income  groups are formed  according  to gross income (gross  money
Income  in  CSFR)  per household  member.
The Definition  of Income
The problem  of what constitutes  income  is, in addition  to the usual
reasons,  such as treatment  of capital  gains,  distinction  between  nominal
and  real  return  on assets,  etc, compounded  because  of (1)  income  earned  in
the second or  underground economy, (2) unsatisfactory  design of  the
surveys that mixes household income  with revenues  such as those  derived
from the sale of assets, and (3) exclusion  of practically  all implicit
sources  of income  except  for consumption  in  kind.
The  first  problem  is satisfactorily  dealt  with only  in Hungary.  Other
countries  do not  attempt  to measure  tips,  black  incomes  or to account  for
possible  underestimation  of income  by the households.  The second  problem
is  present  in  Yugoslavia and  the  Income data  were,  as  explained,
corrected.
No survey,  except  Hungarian,  covers  property  incomes  other than net
income  of the  self-employed.  The  Hungarian  survey  includes  net income  from
financial assets. Other  surveys provide information  on  deposits and
withdrawals  from saving  accounts  that  can,  after  making  some assumptions
about  the  relationship  between  the  average  stock  of deposits,  withdrawals,
and interest  received, be used to estimate the value of real interest
received.  However, the omission.  in reality,  is not very important.  In
both 1988 and  1989 the real interest rate on household deposits was28
negative  or at best zero in all the countries  and income  accordingly  was
nil, even if strictly  speaking  income  should  be reduced  when real interest
is negative.  Capital  gains  and losses  or rents  from  owner-occupied  housing
are not estimated.  Probably  the  most important  omission  are capital  gains
realized  on foreign  exchange  holdings.
A more fundamental  problem Is the suitability  of using money income
alone  to measure inequality in conditions where  there  is  rationing,
subsidization  and  widespread  payments  in kind.  To quote  Bergson (1984,  p.
1058)  "(w)ith  prices  below  clearing  levels,  money income  ceases  to be the
sole determinant  of capacity  to acquire  goods; to a degree,  fortitude  in
searching out supplies  and standing in queues, and plain luck, become
consequential". Households  receive  implicit  income  from  consumer
subsidies,  which  hold prices  below  equilibrium  levels,  below-market  rents,
negative  interest  rates  charged  on consumer  loans,  collective  consumption
such as enterprise  financed  health  care, cafeterias,  vacations,  etc., or
special,  often  in-kind,  bonuses  and  premia.  On the  other  hand,  households'
income  was implicitly  reduced through the payment of negative interest
rates  on saving  deposits  and the inflation  tax  on money.
Subsidies  paid  out  by the  state  to cover  the  difference  between  costs
of production  and retail  prices  of consumer  goods, inclusive  of housing
subsidies, give an  indication of  the  size of  of  transfers. Because
equilibrium  prices of some of the subsidized  products  and services  are
greater  than their  costs  of production,  as is the case,  for example,  for
housing or  electricity  where  explicit subsidies cover only operacing
costs,  explicit  subsidies  represent  a lower  limit  of actual  transfers.
Table Al shows that explicit subsidies ranged, in terms of GDP,
between  6 and  7 percent  and In  terms  of households'  gross  incomes  amounted
to twice that percentage.  Only in Yugoslavia,  were explicit subsidies
negligible.
The pervasiveness  of the system, subsidized  vacations for workers,
special  shops  stocked  with unavailable  consumer  durables  for  miners,  etc.,
does not allow one to assert,  as is sometimes  done, that inclusion  of
implicit Incomes  would necessarily  increase  income disparity.18  On the
18  An exaggerated  perception of the nomenklatura  fringe benefits is
common in Eastern  Europe. It is due to often secretive  nature in which
these benefits were distributed.  This has  led people to ascribe them
greater  importance  than  they  really  had.29
contrary,  there  is strong  evidence  that  consumer  subsidies,  easily  the
largest  chunk  of  implicit  income,  have  an  opposite  effect  which  is  likely
to  offset  that  of  the  nomenklatura  perks.
Table  Al:  EXPLICIT  (PAID-OUT)  CONSUMER  SUBSIDIES  a/
In  percent  In  percent  of
of  GDP  household  gross  Income
Poland  (1989)  6.7  13.8
Hungary  (1989)  6.7  12.4
Czechoslovakia  (1988)  5.8  12.9
Bulgaria  (1990)  3.2  n.a.
a/ Excludes  agricultural  subsidies  to producers  and subsidies  to
loss-makers.
Note: Poland: food, transport  and housing subsidies.  Hungary:
consumer  and housing  loan  subsidies  (from  OECD,  1991,  Table  10,  p.64).
Czechoslovakia:  negative  turnover  tax  (consumer  subsidies)  plus  subsidies
for  housing,  residential  heating  and  urban  transport.  Bulgaria:  consumer
subsidies  for  "essential"  products  (from  World  Bank  1991,  p. 38).
Using estimates  by  Matthews (1978)  and various data on  the
nomenklatura  perks  in  P?oland,  Morrisson  (1984)  estimates  an alternative
income  distribution  in  Eastern  Europe  that  includes  the  monetized  value  of
fringe  benefits  appropriated  by the nomenklatura.  Morrisson's  results
(1984,  Table  2)  suggest  that  the  Gini  ccefficient  increases  by  3 to  4  Gini
points.  On the  other  hand,  consumer  subsidies  are income-equalizers  and
due  to  their  size  exert  a significant  impact  on income  distribution.  For
Poland,  it is calculated  that inclusion  of consumer  subsidies  reduces
income  inequality,  measured  by the  Gini  coefficient,  from  21.8  to  20.0.
Kupa  and  Fajth  (1990,  p.37)  similarly  calculate  for  Hungary  that  the  Gini
coefficient  is reduced  from  23.1,  for  disposable  income, to  22.0,  for
disposable  income  plus subsidies.  Finally,  for CSFR some preliminary
evidence  points  to  the  same  conclusion:  the  negative  turnover  tax,  a type
of  consumer  subsidy,  represents  7.1  percent  of  households'  expenditures  in
the  lowest  and  4.4  percent  in  the  highest  income  decile  (World  Bank,  1991,
p.59).  On the basis  of household  expenditure  surveys,  Vecernik  (1991,
p.17)  calculates  that  lowest  quart'le  of  households  received  per  capita
7.5  percent  more  food  subsidies  than  the  average  while  the  top  quartile30
received  6.1  percent  less  than the  average.19
The  inclusion of  consumer subsidies on  top of  the nomenklatura
in-kind  benefits  would probably  bring the Gini coefficient  close to its
money  incomes  only value.  It can  be thus argued  that the  use  money Income
yields  an  accurate picture of  income  inequality even  in  socialist
economies.  Moreover as far as international  comparisons  are concerned,
similar adjustments for  in-kind benefits could  easily  increase the
measured  inequality  in market economies.  In some countries,  e.g. Japan,
fringe  benefits  of upper  management  often  exceed  their  salaries  while the
offsetting effects of  consumer subsidies on  income distribution are
negligible. 20
19  The implicit  assumption  is that  households  with different  incomes  pay
the  same  average  price  for  the  subsidized  good. In other  words,  if they  do
not buy the entire  quantity  at the subsidized  price, the percentages  of
consumption  at subsidized  and free-market  price are independent  of the
level  of income.
20  Note that social transfers to the poor are  largely monetized  and
already  Included  in the  money  income.31
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